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I.   Introduction 
Fish is an important part of human diet, contributing 17% of the world population’s 
intake of animal protein.1 Globally, the fish consumption rate has been growing faster 
than global population growth since 1961. 2  Although the global aquaculture 
production has been increasing rapidly since the late 1980s, bridging the impressive 
gap between supply and demand, the fish production is still unable to meet the human 
demand. The international community now faces a great challenge to get enough fish 
for a population in excess of 9 billion people by the middle of the twenty-first century. 
Since the aquaculture production has been increasing more slowly in recent decades, as 
compared to the high annual human growth rates in the1980s and 1990s,3 there are 
more pressures on capture fisheries. The global capture fisheries production reached 
90.9 million tonnes in 2016, representing 53 percent of the total fish production,4 and 
it is forecasted that the number will be reaching more than 94 million tonnes in 2025. 
According to the report revealed by FAO, marine catches constitute most of the capture 
fisheries production, presenting 87.2 of the global total.5 However, the status of fishery 
resources is in a worrisome situation. In 2015, 31.5 percent of fish stocks are fished at 
a biologically unsustainable level, three times that of 1974, while 59.9 percent of the 
species are fully fished.6 The marine ecosystems have been already under stress from 
climate change, pollution and habitat degradation, making the sustainable fisheries face 
more severe challenges. How to develop sustainable capture fisheries in economic, 
ecological and social dimensions is with great importance for the international 
 
1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2018—
Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals, FAO, Rome, 2018, p.13. 
2 See J.L. Anderson., F. Asche, T. Garlock, J. Chu, Aquaculture: Its role in the future of food, Frontiers of 
Economics and Globalization, Vol.17, 2017, p. 160 
3 See supera note 1, p. 17. 
4 Ibid, pp.2-3. 





community and needs a variety of cooperation among countries.  
While cooperation is more urgent, it is also complicated in the management of 
transboundary fisheries. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) 
created the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime, which makes more than 90% of the 
world’s commercial fish stocks under the national jurisdiction of coastal states.7 The 
regulation of fisheries may vary among states due to different objectives in light of their 
own social and economic circumstances. However, the fish do not respect national 
boundaries, and the biological characteristic of the fish demonstrates that the long-term 
sustainability of fisheries can only be achieved through cooperation and coordination 
among states, especially for the conservation of straddling and highly migratory species. 
Despite many efforts made by regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), 
there has been slow progress in promoting effective and sustainable management of 
transboundary fisheries. The ocean may have more than 1,500 transboundary fish 
stocks, but only a limited number are subjected to effective cooperative management.8 
For example, the high economic value species-Tuna, is highly migratory and often 
straddling distributed, and it is reported that 43 percent of the principal market tuna 
species were fished at biologically unsustainable levels in 2015.9 Thus, how to well 
manage transboundary fisheries is one of the most pressing issues on the way towards 
achieving long-term sustainable fisheries. This chapter aims to provide an overview of 
China’s practice on transboundary fisheries management and to discuss the existing 
issues and future challenges China faces. 
 
II.   The Nature and Social Conditions of China’s Fisheries 
China is located in East Asia along the coastline of the west Pacific Ocean, bordering 
 
7 World Review of Highly Migratory Species and Straddling Stocks, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, p.3. 
Available at www.fao.org/3/T3740E/T3740E00.htm#TOC, last accessed 11 December 2019. 
8 FAO Fisheries Report No. 695, Supplement, Papers Presented at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the 
Management of Shared Fish Stocks, Bergen, Norway, 7-10 October 2002, p.26. Available at 
http://ftp.fao.org/docrep/FAO/006/y4652e/y4652e00.pdf, last accessed 21 December 2019.  
9  See N. Ramsden, FAO: States of World’s Fisheries declining, 10 July 2018, available at 





one internal sea, the Bohai Sea and three semi-enclosed seas, East China Sea, Yellow 
Sea and South China Sea. It has coastlines of more than 18,000 kilometers and island 
coastlines of 14,000 kilometers.10 The semi-closed nature of the waters makes China’s 
transboundary fisheries management more difficult, since the fisheries sustainability 
requires a variety of cooperation between the surrounding coastal states. In the East 
China Sea and Yellow Sea, China shares fisheries resources with Japan, North Korea 
and South Korea. 11  The situation in the South China Sea is even much more 
complicated, due to the factors not only because it is surrounded by China, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia, but also most of the 
economic fish stocks in the South China Sea are straddling stocks. The introduction of 
the EEZ regime extended the jurisdiction of coastal states, but meanwhile, it brought 
new tensions. The overlapping claims exist both in the East China Sea and South China 
Sea and the complicated political relations create obstacles to the development of 
fisheries cooperation in these seas. 
Besides the geographic setting, the socioeconomic circumstances of East Asian 
countries are quite different from countries in other regions. The East Asian countries 
have the high population density, with China, Japan and Korea accounting for 13 
percent of the world population. With the decrease of terrestrial resources, marine 
fisheries are critical to ease the pressure from the population growth and promote 
economic development. The East Asian countries possess 3.5 million fishing vessels, 
accounting for 75 percent of the global fleet, and the fisheries industry plays a vital role 
in their national economies. China is the world’s top fish producer and exporter, and in 
2017 the total value of the fishery output was 1231.385 billion yuan, of which the output 
value of marine capture fishery was 198.765 billion yuan.12 Meanwhile, Vietnam and 
Thailand are also the major fish exporters, and Japan presented the third largest single 
market for fish and fish products.13 Those significant social and economic factors 
 
10 R. Blomeyer, I. Goulding, D. Pauly, A. Sanz, and S. Kim, The Role of China in World Fisheries, Directorate 
General for Internal Policies Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, 2012, p.12. Available at 
http.//www.europarl.europa.eu/studies, last accessed 25 December 2019 
11 Guifang Xue, China and International Fisheries Law and Policy, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2005, p.79. 
12 China Fisheries Yearbook 2018(in Chinese), Beijing: China Agriculture Press, 2018, p.1. 
13 See supera note 1, p. 26. 
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might cause the competitive exploitation of shared fish stocks and pose challenges to 
fisheries conservation and management. Although the management of transboundary 
fisheries has been a long-time challenge, China has taken steps trying to achieve the 
level of compliance with international standards. 
 
III.   The International Legal Framework on Transboundary Fisheries 
The LOSC provides the duty of states to cooperate on transboundary fisheries according 
to the different characteristics of fish stocks. “Transboundary stocks” in a broad sense 
refers to any fish stocks that swim across jurisdictional boundaries of more than one 
state or between coastal states’ EEZs and the high seas.14 Thus, it includes shared 
stocks, straddling stocks and high migratory species, and the LOSC provides the basic 
rights and obligations of states in respect of these stocks.15 
(1) Shared stocks 
Shared stocks refer to fish stocks shared by two or more coastal states whose EEZs are 
contiguous. According to Article 63(1) of the LOSC: 
“Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or 
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures 
necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such 
stocks.”16 
As to the states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, the LOSC also requires 
the coastal states to take measures to coordinate the management, conservation, 
exploration of the shared stocks17 and to coordinate the implementation of the rights 
and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment.18 
  Despite the requirements of cooperation and coordination on shared stocks under the 
 
14 E. Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources, Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers,1989, p.1. 
15
 A.V. Houtte, Legal Aspects in the Management of Shared Fish Stocks-A Review, available at 
www.fao.org/3/Y4652E/y4652e04.htm#bm04，last accessed 25 December 2019 
16 The LOSC, Article 63 (1). 
17 The LOSC, Article 123(a). 
18 The LOSC, Article 123(b). 
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LOSC, in the absence of a compulsory obligation to reach agreement as well as of clear 
guidance as to how cooperation takes place, the management measures for shared 
stocks are effected through state practice.  
In practice a variety of cooperative arrangements have been put in place. The 
arrangements present various forms and institutional structures. The management 
measures for shared stocks may take the form of a periodic arrangement negotiated 
under a pre-existing framework treaty,19 like the 1989 Agreement between Denmark, 
Iceland and Norway concerning the Capelin Stocks between Greenland, Iceland and 
Jan Mayen,20 or adopted by a general cooperation agreement on an ad hoc basis, like 
the 1982 Nauru Agreement concerning the Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries 
of Common Interest.21  
As to the enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, a more common practice is the measures 
adopted by a regional fisheries organisation or taken by a bilateral commission set up 
especially for the management of shared stocks. China’s practice is mainly on this 
approach, which will be discussed in detail in the following part. 
(2) Straddling and highly migratory stocks 
Straddling fish stocks and highly migratory stocks are both transboundary and occur on 
the high seas.22 The straddling fish stocks is a concept developed in recent years, which 
refers to fish stocks that move back and forth between in both, the EEZ of one or more 
states and the high seas. Article 63(2) of the LOSC provides a general provision that 
coastal states and states fishing for straddling fish stocks  
“shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional 
organizations, to agree upon measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks 
in the adjacent area.” 
 
19 P. R. Churchill, and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd Edition), Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999, p.295. 
20 The agreement provides that the parties shall seek to agree on a total allowable catch (TAC) for capelin each year. 
If no agreement can be reached, Iceland is to set the TAC. The TAC is divided into fixed percentages - 78% to Iceland 
and 11% to each of the other two parties; annual consultations and negotiations are held to decide on 
unilateral/bilateral quota arrangements, licensing arrangements and other management measures. 
21 See supra note 19, p.296. 
22 T. Henriksen, G. Honneland, and A. Sydnes, Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Regime, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p.14. 
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However, this provision is lack of the substantive guidance as to how to address the 
potential conflicts arising from the allocation of catches between coastal states and high 
seas fishing states.23 This provision only requires them to take cooperative measures 
for conservation purposes in the high seas, but not in the EEZs.24 Although according 
to Article 116(2), the freedom of high seas is subject to the “rights and duties and the 
interests of coastal states”, when applying to the straddling stocks, the situation became 
very complicated. It is difficult to clarify what are the “rights and duties and the interests 
of coastal states” while the stocks are on the high seas.25 In practice, coastal states may 
take measures to restrict the fishing for straddling fish stocks on the high seas, with the 
purpose of the long-term well-being of the stocks concerned.  
  As to the highly migratory stocks, Annex 1 of the LOSC listed those species which 
migrate considerable distance during their life cycle, crossing the EEZs of two or more 
states and the high seas. The rights and obligations of states in respect of highly 
migratory stocks differ from those in respect of the straddling stocks. For the 
management of straddling stocks, the states are obliged to take measures for 
conservation purposes only in the high seas, while under Article 64 of LOSC, the states 
shall cooperate to ensure conservation and promote the objective of optimum utilization 
of highly migratory stocks throughout the region, both in EEZs and the high seas. Thus, 
the conservation of highly migratory stocks requires more integrated measures and 
concerted efforts by all states involved in fishing.  
The requirement in the LOSC is further affirmed by the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the 1995 Agreement). The 1995 Agreement was 
concluded with the aim to address the shortcomings of the LOSC provision on the high 
seas, especially Article 63(2).26 It accords the RFMOs more authority and provides 
non-flag states enforcement. The obligations to conserve and cooperate were 
 
23 See supra note 19, p.305. 
24 Ibid. 
25
 See supra note 15. 
26
Ibid, p.11.  
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strengthened by the adoption of the precautionary approach.  
Besides the above instruments, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) also 
adopted the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which requires all states to 
ensure sustainable exploitation of marine living resources and promote cooperation in 
fisheries management. For fish stocks are exploited by two or more states, the states 
involved should cooperate through the fisheries organization or arrangement to ensure 
the compatibility of management measures.27 
 
IV.   China’s Fishery Management  
(1)  Legal instruments  
Fisheries Law of the People’s Republic of China is the primary national law to regulate 
all fisheries-related activities. It was adopted in 1986 and amended in 2000 and 2004. 
The existing law provides a broad legislative framework for the management, 
conservation, and sustainable development of China’s fisheries resources, and it 
contains some important management and conservation measures which are listed in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: China’s Management Measures for Capture Fisheries 
Type  Measures 
Input Control Fisheries license System 
Minimum mesh size 
Output Control Total Allowable Catch system 
Closed seasons  
Closed zones for bottom trawling 
Technical Control Minimum mesh size of fishing nets 
Minimum catch size of fishing targets 
Ban of destructive fishing methods 
Economic Instruments Fisheries resources protection fees 
 
27 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Article 7.1.3 
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Fish stock damage compensation 
Resource Fee Collection  
Distant water fisheries management Application and approval system  
Annual examination system  
Fishing vessels and crew management 
system 
  Source: Shuolin Huang, and Yuru He, ‘Management of China's capture fisheries: 
Review and prospect’, Aquaculture and Fisheries 4 (2019), pp 173–182. 
 
Although there are abundant regulations and management measures in place, they 
are not adequate to embrace the complexity of fishery management and some of the 
regulations are not properly implemented. It is criticized that the Fisheries Law has not 
adapted to the requirements of the current situation. 28  For example, there are no 
relevant provisions related to the penalties of illegal fishing activities, increasing the 
difficulty of law enforcement. In addition, China’s fisheries policy has been shifted 
towards a more ecological way since the 1990s. In 2006, the “Program of Action on the 
Conservation of Living Aquatic Resource of China” was promulgated by the Chinese 
government, which provides that “ by 2020, the aquatic environment should be 
gradually rehabilitated, and catch from marine capture fisheries should generally 
accommodate the supporting ability of fishery resources.” 29  It is suggested the 
Fisheries Law pay more attention to sustainable development of fisheries. 
Thus, the revision of the Fisheries Law has received great attention and has been 
included in the work plans of the State Council and the National People's Congress, and 
it is currently under revision. In August 2019, the draft of the revised Fisheries Law 
was released to the public for consultation.30 
 
28 See Yukun Li, Ministry of Agriculture: the current fisheries law has not adapted to the new situation, and the 
revision has been included in the work plan(in Chinese), 25 October 2018, available at 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1615287830917762649&wfr=spider&for=pc, last accessed 25 December 2019.  
29 Program of Action on the Conservation of Living Aquatic Resource of China, Long-term goal, available at 
pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=e80262bedf8dc8f20d5e7bff00d4b652bdfb, last accessed 25 December 2019. 
 
30 See ‘The Fisheries Law is currently under the revised procedure’ (in Chinese), 21 October 2019, available at 
ocean.china.com.cn/2019-10/21/content_75322543.htm, last accessed 25 December 2019. 
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In the draft of the revised Fisheries Law, the closed season management system will 
be further refined, the corresponding legal responsibilities will be supplemented and 
improved, the penalty cost will be significantly increased, and the pertinence, 
operability and deterrence of the law will be enhanced. 
Except the Fisheries Law, the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
(1992 Territorial Sea Law )31  and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf (1998 EEZ Law)32 also have relevance to the fisheries management, 
especially to the management of shared stocks. According to the 1992 Territorial Sea 
Law, China possess the 12nm territorial sea and 12nm contiguous zone from the outer 
limit of the territorial sea.33 At the time that China ratified the LOSC, it proclaimed 
part of its straight baselines to measure its maritime zones.34 There is no specific 
provision related to fisheries in the 1992 Territorial Sea Law since China has full 
sovereignty to the territorial sea, and the fishing activities are subject to national 
fisheries laws and regulations.  
Fishery management is an important part of the EEZ legislation. China proclaimed   
its EEZ in 1996 when China ratified the LOSC.35 The 1998 EEZ Law ensures China’s 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its EEZ and continental shelf. According to the 
1998 EEZ Law, China has sovereign rights in its EEZ for the purpose of exploring, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, and it has the right to take conservation 
and management measures to prevent the living resources in the EEZ from any harm 
of over-exploitation.36 This stipulation ensures that China has the right to conserve and 
manage transboundary species that originate in China. According to the LOSC, coastal 
state should determine its allowable catch in the EEZ, and if the coastal state does not 
 
31 The Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone was promulgated on 25 February 1992. Text in English 
is available at www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocottsatcz739/, last accessed 25 December 2019. 
32 The Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf was adopted on 26 June 1998. Text in English 
is available at www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1767, last accessed 25 December 2019. 
33 1992 Territorial Sea Law, Article 3. 
34 The baselines for the mainland are from Shandong Peninsular to Hainan Island, and baselines are decided for the 
Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands), for details on this, see Keyuan Zou, ‘Sino-Japanese joint fishery management in the 
East China Sea’, Marine Policy, Vol. 27, 2003, pp.130-131. 
35
 Keyuan Zou, ‘China's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf: developments, problems, and prospects’, 
Marine Policy, Vol.25, 2001, p.73. 
36 1998 EEZ Law, Article 6. 
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have the capacity to harvest all the allowable catch, it should allow other states to get 
the surplus of the allowable catch.37 However, the 1998 EEZ law does not contain any 
provision regarding the surplus of allowable catch. The reason may be that there is no 
surplus left due to the overexploitation. Even so, the law does not prohibit foreign 
fishing in China’s EEZ. Foreign fishing in China’s EEZ needs to get a permit from the 
Chinese authorities. 38  China has the right to take measures, such as boarding, 
inspection and arrest to ensure the foreign fishing to comply with Chinese laws and 
regulations.39  
 
(2) Institutional arrangements  
Fisheries management falls under the responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries of 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), which is the highest fisheries authority in China. Its 
main function is to administer fishery sector, put forward development strategies on 
fisheries, draft related laws, draw up measures for the protection of fishery resources, 
administer the permits of fishing boats, and coordinate fishing activities nationwide.40 
In order to ensure the rationality of fisheries management policy, the MOA has a 
governmental scientific institution—the Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences, 41 
which provides technical support and makes policy recommendations. 
   It should be noted that China has implemented the plan for the reform of the 
ministerial structure since March 2018. Under the reform, the inspection, supervision 
and management of fishing vessels is now within the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Transport.42  In addition, the Ministry of Natural Resources is responsible for the 
management of the marine protected areas, which include the areas where fishing 
activities are prohibited or restricted.43 The new institutional structure will inevitably 
 
37 The LOSC, Article 62(2). 
38 1998 EEZ Law, Article 5. 
39 1998 EEZ Law, Article 12. 
40 The main functions of Bureau of Fisheries are listed on the official website of Ministry of Agriculture, available 
at english.agri.gov.cn/aboutmoa/departments/201301/t20130115_9518.htm, last accessed 25 December 2019. 
41
 Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences is a subordinate institution of MOA, see english.agri.gov.cn/aboutmoa/ium/, 
last accessed 25 December 2019. 
42 See the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Plan on Deepening Reform of Party and State Institutions, 





create challenges to fisheries management since the effective and successful 
management calls for cooperation and coordination among different governmental 
authorities. 
To ensure the enforcement of fisheries laws and regulations, three coastal fisheries 
management bureaus were established at the regional level. They are the Bureau of 
Yellow Sea and Bohai Bay, Bureau of East China Sea and Bureau of South China Sea. 
There are also local fisheries bureaus at coastal provinces and municipal local fisheries 
authorities. 
 
V. China’s Practice on the Management of Shared Stocks 
China is a country bordering semi-enclosed seas, where EEZ claims overlap, which 
makes the management of shared stocks extremely important and complicated. Semi-
enclosed seas are separated from oceans by narrow straits; thus, they are more 
vulnerable to human activities.44 The Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South 
China Sea are of dense biodiversity and high bio-productivity, the sustainability and 
conservation of species in these areas is important for the world fisheries. In addition, 
the fish stocks in the semi-closed seas usually migrate across the national boundaries 
for spawning, breeding and feeding.45 Hence, collective actions with the purpose of the 
conservation of shared stocks become imperative, even in the sea areas where 
conflicting territorial claims are pending. With the efforts of many years, China has 
promoted cooperative management for the shared stocks through bilateral fisheries 
agreements.  
(1) Management of Shared Stocks in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea 
In the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, China fulfill its obligations of cooperation by 
signing bilateral fisheries agreements with Japan and Korea respectively.  
The efforts of joint fishery management between China and Japan can be traced back 
to 1955, and it has gone through three main stages of development by three bilateral 
 
44 See supera note 11, p. 175. 
45 Guifang Xue, ‘Bilateral Fisheries Agreements for the Cooperative Management of the Shared Resources of the 
China Seas: A Note’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol.36, 2005, p.371. 
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agreements. In June 1955, the first (non-governmental) fishery agreement was reached 
between the Japan-China Fisheries Council the China Fisheries Association and played 
a vital role in developing fishery relations between China and Japan.46 The second 
agreement was signed and came into force in 1975. Although the 1975 agreement was 
largely the same as the previous one, including six conservation zones and seven fishing 
closed zones, 47  it first established a joint fishery committee, ensuring to better 
implement the agreement as well as to promote the conservation of fisheries resources 
in a harmonious way. After the adoption of the LOSC, the EEZs regime created more 
challenges to the fishery relations of the two countries, and it inevitably needed a new 
adjustment. Thus, after several rounds of negotiations, China and Japan signed a new 
fisheries agreement in 1997 (Sino-Japan Fishery Agreement), 48  in which the 
conservation of shared stocks is one of the primary matters. 
China and Korea shared the fishery resources in the Yellow Sea and the north part of 
the East China Sea. The joint efforts to conserve the shared stocks are based on the 
Agreement on Fisheries between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of 
Korea (Sino-Korean Fishery Agreement), which was signed in 2000 and became 
effective in 2001.  
The two agreements provide similar frameworks and approaches to managing shared 
stocks in the following aspects: 
  Firstly, the two agreements adopted general principles to strengthen bilateral 
cooperation including the principle of conserving marine living resources of common 
concern and the principle of reciprocity. The contracting parties commit to cooperate to 
conserve marine living resources and adopt necessary measures to ensure their nationals 
and fishing boats comply with the conservation measures. The nationals and fishing 
boats of both sides have the right to fish in each other’s EEZs based on the principle of 
reciprocity. However, the fishing boats of each party should obtain a fishing permit of 
 
46 Keyuan Zou, ‘Sino-Japanese joint fishery management in the East China Sea’, Marine Policy, Vol. 27, 2003, 
p.126. 
47
 Ibid, p.127. 
48 Sino-Japan Fishery Agreement came into force in June 2000. 
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the other party’s competent authority,49 and fishery activities in the other’s EEZ must 
comply with the agreements and the other’s domestic law and regulations.50 The two 
agreements set forth the conditions under which arrest or detention is allowed.  
  Secondly, the Joint Fishery Committee (JFC) was established to ensure the 
effectively cooperation. The JFC plays key roles in cooperative management of shared 
fisheries resources. It has the power to make recommendations on the conservation and 
management measures, including the catch of fishery species, allocation of fishing 
quotas and other specific conditions for fishing in the other Party. Recommendation is 
subject to the unanimous consent of the committee members, and both sides should 
comply with the recommendations and adopted necessary measures in accordance with 
the decision.51  
In addition, in the areas where EEZ claims of the two parties overlap, a Provisional 
Measures Zone (PMZ) was established. Under the Sino-Japan Fishery Agreement, the 
PMZ is located between the parallels of 27 °N and Lat. 30°40’N, and in the middle of 
the East China sea, 52nm from the baseline of the territorial seas for the Chinese 
mainland coast, while the Sino-Korea Fishery Agreement sets up a PMZ between the 
parallels of 32°11’N and Lat.37 °N, in the middle of Yellow Sea (See Figure 1). In the 
PMZs, The JMC has the responsibility to take into account each party’s resource 
conditions, national catch capability as well as the traditional fishery activities to decide 
on the appropriate management measures, especially the total amount of fishing quotas 
apply to the PMZ. After years of practice, the two JFCs have developed various 
measures to achieve the conservation purpose. For example, the joint patrols of vessels 
were conducted in the China-Korea PMZ, which have significant effect on cracking 
down the illegal fishing, and the latest joint patrol was launched by the end of 2019.52 
To ensure the conservation measure based on scientific information, the China-Korea 
Expert Group Meeting is convened regularly to exchange information on the 
implementation of the resource survey on the PMZ, and to report the findings of 
 
49 Sino-Japan Fishery Agreement, Article 2;Sino-Korean Fishery Agreement, Article 2. 
50 Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, Article 4; Sino-Korean Fishery Agreement, Article 4. 
51 Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, Article 11(4), Sino-Korean Agreement, Article 13(4). 
52 See www.yyj.moa.gov.cn/gzdt/201904/t20190418_6196075.htm, last accessed 11 October 2019. 
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respective surveys to the JFC.53 In the China-Japan PMZ, China and Japan set target 
values for catches of different fishery species and count the catches according to the 
ways of operation and species respectively, and the JFC determines annually the target 
values of each country, based on the catch reports and the fishery status of the two 
sides.54 China and Japan also need to exchange the lists of each party’s nationals and 
fishing vessels that fishing in the PMZ, and notify each other the regulations related to 
the operating modes recorded in the roster.  
 
Figure 1: Provisional Zones of Sino-Japan/Sino-Korean Fisheries Agreements 
 
Source: Guifang Xue, ‘Bilateral Fisheries Agreements for the Cooperative 
Management of the Shared Resources of the China Seas: A Note’, Ocean Development 
and International Law, Vol.36, 2005, p.370. 
 
To better implement the management measures, the flag state jurisdiction applies in 
the PMZ, which allows the detention of fishing vessels in case of any violation of 
 
53 See www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/YYJ/201411/t20141104_4125427.htm, last accessed 11 October 2019. 
54 See www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/YYJ/201502/t20150203_4392655.htm, last accessed 11 October 2019. 
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operation conditions by the other party. The party, with due regard to notification, 
should inform the other party of the related details and the result after necessary 
measures have been taken.55 Thus, the regime applied to PMZs, created a sustainable 
fishing order in the undelimited maritime areas so as to protect the shared resources 
from the harm of overexploited.  
The two agreements have created a mechanism of fishery cooperation for the 
management of shared stocks despite some complex political factors, and it can be 
regarded as important pioneering efforts made by China to fulfill relevant international 
obligation. However, from a resource management perspective, it also has some 
limitations.  
  Firstly, the management measures of shared stocks are not based on an ecosystem 
approach. Although the large common fishery zones were established, they only cover 
part of the East China Sea. Unregulated water exists in the two agreement. For example, 
the territorial waters of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, where fishing activities are not 
regulated. However, many fish stocks migrate seasonally from the PMZ to the 
unregulated waters, and the effects of fishery conservation might be greatly 
compromised by the fishing activities in the unregulated waters. In addition to the 
problem of unregulated areas, bilateral allocation was not capable of dealing with 
shared stocks in a biological way. Almost all fish stocks in the East China Sea migrate 
beyond any one state,56 thus the two-player model of management cannot cover the 
whole migratory range of the fish stocks. The effective conservation requires the 
cooperation of all interested countries. Since the bilateral agreement cannot regulate the 
fishing activities of a third party, there is an urgent need to reach a regional or 
multilateral fishery arrangement of shared stocks in the East China Sea. 
  Secondly, although the two agreements allowed for cooperative management in the 
PMZs, they did not provide for cooperative management of stocks that migrated 
between the respective fishery zones, and there is a lack of dispute settlement 
 
55 Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, Article 7. 
56 Guifang Xue, ‘Bilateral Fisheries Agreements for the Cooperative Management of the Shared Resources of the 
China Seas: A Note’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol.36, 2005, p.376. 
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procedures to deal with the disagreements on management issues. Even in the PMZs, 
the JFCs have the power to decide the allocation of fishing quotas, but fail to consider 
the migratory characteristics of fish stocks. There are lots of migratory species in the 
East China sea and the Yellow sea, and some are commercially harvested by China, 
Korea and Japan. In order to prevent overfishing, it is reasonable to facilitate 
cooperative management of transboundary resources. There are plenty of successful 
examples in state practice to manage shared stocks. Canada and US signed the US-
Canada Pacific Hake Agreement to jointly manage the transboundary stock of Pacific 
hake.57 Under the Agreement, the total allowable catch (TAC) is decided jointly, with 
the input from both scientific advisory panels and consultation with the Industry 
Advisory Panel. 58  In the East China sea and the Yellow sea, multilateral fishery 
arrangement should also be placed between the different countries sharing access to a 
commercially transboundary fish stock.  
  In addition, the two agreements are insufficient to deal with illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing. In recent years, conflicts over IUU fishing intensifies 
between Chinese fishmen and Korea Coast Guard (KCG). In 2014, a Chinese fishing 
boat captain was killed by KCG due to resisting an inspection.59 On 1 November 2016, 
two Chinse boats were shots fired by the KCG.60 On 4 January 2018, the KCG used 
individual weapons and crew-served weapons against Chinese fishmen. 61  These 
incidents reflect that tensions in regard to EEZ fishing has been growing in the Yellow 
Sea due to Korea’s stricter law enforcement. To make the use of force against IUU 
fishing lawful, the KCG promulgated a new internal rules-Manual on the Use of 
Weapon on 8 November 2016 and the Maritime Security Act was amended on 18 April 
 
57 The US-Canada Pacific Hake Agreement was ratified in 2003, but formally implemented in 2012.  
58 M. Bailey, G. Ishimura, R. Paisley, and U.R. Sumaila, ‘Moving beyond catch in allocation approaches for 
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59  ‘South Korean coast guard kills Chinese boat captain’, 10 October 2014, available at 
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captain/, last accessed 25 December 2019. 
60
  L. Collins, ‘Is South Korea’s use of force against Chinese Fishing Vessel illegal?’, available at 
https://amti.csis.org/rok-force-chinese-vessels-illegal/, last accessed 25 December 2019. 
61 H.J. Kim, ‘South Korea's use of force against Chinese illegal fishing in the course of law enforcement in the 
Yellow Sea’, Marine Policy, Vol. 99, 2019, p.150.  
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2017 to settle the procedure for the use of weapons throughout law enforcement.62 It 
is obvious that use of force is not an appropriate way to settle down the issue of IUU 
fishing, the two states should find a peaceful way to deal with this problem. There are 
several reasons that contribute to the IUU fishing in the Korea’s territorial waters or 
EEZ. First of all, the maritime demarcation is still unsolved which makes the fisheries 
arrangement rather vulnerable. The coastal states may strengthen their jurisdiction by 
exercising fishery rights, in order to take advantage in the negotiation of maritime 
delimitation. Secondly, the allocation of fishery resources is unbalanced. The waters 
near South Korea is the main feeding ground and wintering area for fish stocks; as a 
result, the fishery resources are much richer in comparison with which in the waters 
near China.63 However, the government of South Korea over the past decade has taken 
steps to reduce the number of the fishing vessels with the aim of conservation of fishery 
resources.64 Consequently, the number of vessels that were permitted to fishing in the 
EEZ of South Korea was declined, which possess a dramatic challenge to Chinese 
fishmen. Moreover, the complicated issue of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) between 
the South Korea and North Korea has been recognized as a contributing factor to IUU 
fishing. It was reported that Chinese fishmen take advantage of the fishing contracts 
with North Korea and then illegally cross the NLL to fish in the South Korean waters.65 
The long-standing fishery conflicts between China and Korea shows that there are still 
significant gaps in the Sino-Korea Fishery Agreement. The two parties should maintain 
peaceful fisheries by reaching a consensus on dispute settlement and promoting the 
establishment of fishery cooperation and law enforcement mechanism. 
  Finally, both the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement and Sino-Korean Fishery 
Agreement fail to address the issue of third party’s interests. The fishery arrangements 
in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea are very complex due to the overlapping 
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jurisdictions of China, Japan and Korea. The third party’s interests may be affected by 
any bilateral fishery arrangements concluded by the other two states. However, Korea 
is not satisfied with the northern limit line of the common fishery zone of Sino-Japanese 
Fishery Agreement, while China claimed that the Japan-Korea Fishery Agreement 
encroached on China’s sovereign rights over its EEZ.66 In spite of this, one survey 
revealed that there are overlapping areas of China-Japan-Korea Fisheries Agreements 
(See Figure 2).67 The potential conflicts may arise due to the interplay between the 
various bilateral fishery agreements, and to make matters worse, Japan signed a fishery 
agreement with Taiwan on fishing rights in the disputed area-Diaoyu Islands in 2013. 
The complex political situation and increasing fishery conflicts make the current fishery 
arrangements in the East China Sea problematic, and a multilateral fishery arrangement 
is needed to pursuit a secured legal order in the East China Sea. 
 
Figure 2: The overlapping areas of the China-Japan-Korea Fisheries Agreements 
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Source: Seokwoo Lee, Young Kil Park, and Hansan Park, ‘The complex legal status 
of the Current Fishing Pattern Zone in the East China Sea’, Marine Policy, Vol.81, 
2017, p.221, Figure 2.  
 
(2) Management of Shared Stocks in the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea 
The South China Sea, as a semi-enclosed sea, is situated at Southeast Asia, with an area 
of 648,000 square nautical miles,
68
 and it connects to the East China Sea via the Taiwan 
Strait. The political and legal situation of the South China Sea is very complicated, 
since there are overlapping claims of sovereignty, overlapping claims to maritime zones 
and disputes over resources utilization. 69  The rising tensions in this region have 
attracted the attention of the world community in the past decades, and also make 
fisheries management more difficult.  
The South China Sea is of strategic importance to all the adjacent countries, not only 
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it contains a critical sea route for international trade, but also for its abundant marine 
resources and rich biodiversity. An investigation in the year of 2000 shows that a total 
of 3,365 species of fishes in 263 families are recorded from South China Sea. 70 
However, with the development of fishing activities and growing competitions for the 
limited fish stocks, the fishery resources in the South China Sea have become depleted 
over time. It is reported that some waters of the South China Sea have less than one-
tenth of fish stocks they had six decades ago.71 Most of the small pelagic species are 
already fully exploited.72  
The South China Sea is presently under the strong pressure of overfishing and 
resources depletion, the coastal states surrounding it, therefore, need to take effective 
measures to ensure that the fish stocks are managed in a sustainable manner. Since most 
of the economic fish stocks in the South China Sea are shared or straddling stocks, 
cooperation between the countries is inevitable and urgent. It has been suggested that 
to set aside the sovereignty claims and focus on joint development and management of 
the natural resources is the best approach to managing the territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea.73 As the biggest bordering state, China generated serious concerns to 
cooperate on fishery management. There is no multilateral agreement or regional 
fisheries management organization in the South China Sea, and China’s practice on 
cooperative management for the shared stocks mainly relies on bilateral arrangements.  
 China and Vietnam signed the Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, 
Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Beibu Gulf and the 
Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Beibu Gulf (Sino-Vietnamese Fishery 
Agreement) in 2000.74 Both came into force in June 2004. These two agreements 
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provide a legal framework for the conservation and management of fishery resources 
in Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf and create a cooperative mechanism to manage shared fishery 
resources.  
A Common Fishery Zone (CFZ), a transitional agreement zone and a buffer zone for 
small fishing boats were established under the Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement, 
within which different management measures were applied. The CFZ plays a vital role 
for managing shared stocks, as it is located in the EEZ of the two sides (See Figure 3), 
with the area of 30,000 square kilometers, covering most of the high productive fishing 
grounds.75 In the CFZ, the two sides should undertake long-term fisheries cooperation 
and jointly take measures to manage and maintain sustainable utilization of the living 
resources.76 China and Vietnam can formulate and apply domestic laws to their own 
side of the CFZ. Fishing boats from both sides must abide by the regulations if they 
intend to enter into the CFZ for fishing. When they intend to fish in the other party’s 
CFZ, a special permit is needed. In comparison with the PMZs established under the 
Sino-Japan/Sino-Korea Agreement, the CFZ is not only considerably larger, accounting 
for 27.9% of the Gulf’s total,77 but also has stricter and more effective measures. For 
example, fishmen are required to report if they take refuge in other party’s harbor due 
to bad weather or emergencies;78 it is prohibited to catch marine mammals or other 
endangered species, bycatch should be released to the sea immediately and the fishing 
methods such as the use of explosive, electricity and poison are prohibited.79 
 
Figure 3: The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on the Gulf of Tonkin 
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Source: Yunjun Yu and Yongtong Mu, ‘The new institutional arrangements for fisheries 
management in Beibu Gulf’, Marine Policy, Vol.30, 2006, p.251. 
Note: Zone 1 stands for the Common Fishery Zone while Zone 2 stands for the Transitional 
Agreement Zone. 
 
The special regulations and measures applied to CFZ and the number of vessels of 
each party entering into the CFZ are determined by the Joint Fishery Committee (JFC), 
an institutional mechanism established in accordance with the Fishery Agreement. It 
has a wide range of powers in handling all the issues in relation to the bilateral co-
operation.80 Compared to the JFC of Sino-Japan/Sino-Korea Agreement, the JFC of 
the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement has a broader mandate: it is authorized to 
deal with fisheries disputes occurring in the CFZ, which cannot be settled on the spot,81 
while under the Sino-Japan/Sino-Korea Agreement, the JFC only has the right to make 
recommendations. To exercise its functions, the JFC has formulated the Regulations on 
Conservation and Management Fishery Resources in the Common Fishery Zone in 
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Beibu Gulf, which contains the detailed measures and legal liabilities for violation, 
giving a clear guidance to the nationals of both parties.  
 To avoid any conflict that may arise in the fishery cooperation, the transitional 
agreement zone with a four-year term was designated with the aim to leave time for the 
Chinese fishermen to adjust their fishing patterns.82 In order to avoid unnecessary 
disputes by illegal entry by mistake to the other party’s territorial sea, the buffer zone 
for small fishing boats is set up in the territorial sea of both contracting parties. The 
small fishing boats refer to the boats that the length is less than 15m or no more than 
60HP, when it is found in the buffer zone of the other party, it can be warned or driven 
away from that area by the other party.83 However, when doing do, resort to force or 
imposing punishment is not allowed and the boats in question should not be detained 
or arrested.84 Any dispute related to fishing activities shall be reported to the JFC for 
settlement. 
Although the conservation of shared stocks of the South China Sea calls for the 
cooperation of all relevant states, and any bilateral arrangement is not enough, the 
institutions established under the bilateral fishery agreements can serve as an example 
for a multilateral agreement for the conservation of South China Sea fisheries. The 
Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement marked a new phrase of joint management of 
shared fish stocks since it is a long-term cooperation based on the demarcated maritime 
boundaries. On 30 June 2019, the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement was expired. 
Before the new agreement is concluded, the two parties will continually implement the 
previous agreement. However, it is still uncertain that whether the new agreement will 
retain such a large CFZ in the Gulf of Tokin. 
In addition to Vietnam, China has strengthened fishery cooperation with Indonesia 
and Malaysia in recent years. In 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture of China and the 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries Ministry of Indonesia signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Fisheries. According to the MOU, fisheries cooperation of various 
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forms would be undertaken to combat IUU fishing, promote data and information 
exchange, conserve fishery resources, and develop sustainable capture fisheries 
technical. 85  In the following year, another MOU regarding the implementation 
arrangements for cooperation in capture fisheries was signed to develop a new form of 
cooperation in capture fisheries.86 Under the new arrangement, Chinese enterprises can 
cooperate by setting up joint venture in Indonesia, however, the cooperation of both 
enterprises and fishing boats shall be approved by the authorized departments of both 
parties and the total tonnage of cooperative fishing boats shall be limited to 100-500 
tons.87  
China's fishery cooperation with Malaysia is mainly reflected in fishery technical 
cooperation. China and Malaysia have signed three documents to enhance the marine 
technical operation. In 2017, China and Malaysia jointly formulated an Action Plan to 
increase cooperation in marine science and technology.88 The goals of this plan are to 
promote improve the research capacities of both sides and promote information and 
technology transfer between the research organizations. With this plan, the cooperation 
in marine observation, utilization of marine living resources and marine spatial 
planning would be enhanced. Marine scientific cooperation between China and 
Malaysia can be traced back to the year of 2009 when the two parties signed the 
Agreement on Marine Science and Technology Cooperation.89 After nearly a decade 
of efforts, a number of bilateral cooperation mechanism have been established, such as 
the Joint Committee on Cooperation in Marine Science and Technology and a joint 
Oceanographic Research Center. These cooperation mechanisms have positive 
significance to promote the fisheries cooperation. 
Despite the bilateral cooperation with the neighboring states, China also take various 
fishery conservation measures in the South China Sea to ensure the sustainability of 
fishery resources, and the most important one is the summer fishing ban. China has 
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implemented the summer fishing ban since 1999, and the fishing ban lasts for two or 
three months, usually from May to August.90 The ban applies to the area north to 12 
degrees northern latitude of the South China Sea.91 In 2012, China expended the 
covering area of the fishing ban, including Huangyan Island (Scaborough Shoal) but 
excluding most of the Nansha Islands.92 During the time of ban, all net fishing is closed 
and all waters under the ban is monitored 24 hours a day.93 Any violation will be 
handled in time and different penalties will be imposed according to the types of 
violation. Usually, fishing in the closed seasons will be imposed a fine of less than 
5,0000 yuan, but in serious cases, fishing gears may be confiscated and fishing license 
may be revoked.94 Due to the depletion of the fish stocks, the closed season for all 
operating types has been prolonged from 2-3.5 months to 4.5 months.95 Although 
China’s summer fishing ban in the South China Sea is challenged by Vietnam and the 
Philippines that have seen it as a violation of their jurisdictions over EEZ, it is 
undeniable that the fishing ban has a long-time positive effect on the prevention of 
overfishing and conservation of fish stocks. 
 
VI. China’s Practice on Distant Water Fisheries  
Because of the migratory characteristics of fish, the fish stocks might be exploited by 
several fishing nations, thus, the conservation of transboundary fisheries cannot be 
achieved by individual states, and international cooperation is inevitable. The RFMOs 
play a unique role in promoting the conservation and management of straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks by adopting material and procedural principles and specific 
conservation measures. China is now a member of seven RFMOs, which include the 
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International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC), Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), South Pacific 
Regional Fisheries Management Organization ( SPRFMO), North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission ( NPFC) and Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
resources (CCAMLR).96 
The management principles and strategies adopted by the above RFMOs have great 
impact on China’s distant water fisheries (DWF). After joining the RFMOs, China did 
lots of efforts in controlling distant water fisheries to comply with the international 
standards requested by the RFMOs. Those efforts include adjusting policy and 
regulations, implementing various measures and deterring IUU fishing. 
 
(1) Adjustment of Policy and Regulations 
Since 2007, the concept of ecological civilization was first proposed at the 17th National 
Congress, after then, “construction of ecological civilization” became a guiding 
principle for environmental laws,97 and it also has great impact on China’s strategy of 
DFW. In March 2016, China’s 13th Five-Year Plan was released, in which the ecological 
civilization was one of the priorities, and in November 2017, the Ministry of 
Agriculture issued the 13th Five-Year Plan of National Distant Water Fisheries 
Development (2016-2020),98 with the aim to strengthen standardized management and 
promote orderly development of DFW. The new plan sets up specific objectives for 
DWF, which include putting ceilings on the total number of vessels and reducing the 
number of DFW enterprises. It is stated that by 2020, the total number of vessels will 
have been reduced to less than 3000, and the number of companies involved in China’s 
DWF fleet will remain frozen at the 2016 level. It is reported that there are 161 DWF 
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enterprises in 2016.99 It is no doubt that the new plan will further reform the strategy 
of China’s DWF and have positive impact on the management of straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks. 
  In order to comply with international standards requested by RFMOs. China has also 
developed a series of regulations on DWF. China implemented fishing license system 
on DWF. According to Article 23 of the Fisheries Law, fishing operations on 
jurisdictional seas of other countries or in the jointly managed fishery zones defined in 
the agreements between China and the relevant countries or on the high sea shall obtain 
fishing licenses from the fishery administrative department of the State Council.100 A 
fishing license may be issued to the application only if he fulfills the following 
conditions: (1) has the fishing vessel inspection certificate; (2) has the fishing vessel 
registration certificate; (3)fulfills other conditions stipulated by the department in 
charge of fishery administration of the State Council. 101  To better implement the 
provisions, the Ministry of Agriculture issued the Regulations on Distant Water 
Fisheries in 2003 and it was amended in 2016.102 According to the Regulations, the 
MOA shall adopt a system on the approval and administration of projects as well as on 
the accreditation of enterprise qualification to pelagic fishery and shall supervise and 
administer DWF vessels and seamen in accordance with the law.103 Vessels engaged in 
high sea fishing shall obtain a “license for fishing on the high sea” with the approval of 
MOA,104 and all authorised fishing vessels shall fly China’s flag,105 complete fishing 
logbooks106 and report the date of entry or exit, quantity of fishery captures, main 
species, production value and other information required by RFMOs.107 In order to 
better implement supervision, all fishing vessels are required to install the vessel 
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monitoring system (VMS) and equip crews with qualified technical training certificates 
to ensure the normal operation of the system and provide accurate information.108 
Observers may be placed on board according to the requirements of relevant 
international organization.109  
  In order to further strengthen the management of DWF and adapt to the new changes 
and requirements of international fisheries management, the MOA also revised the 
Measures for the Monitoring and Management of Pelagic Fishing Vessels in 2014,110 
which requires that automatic daily reporting of position by MVS shall not be less than 
6 times a day, once every four hours.111 Those who move, dismantle or has closed the 
MVS without authorization or intentionally provide false report or alter the registration 
information of fishing vessels would be deduct the subsidies.112 In 2016, MOA issued 
the Rules for the Implementation of the Management of Observers to further promote 
the standardization, institutionalization and procedural work of observers.113  Both 
VMS and the observer measures are important management measures adopted by tuna 
RFMOs, the above regulations reflect that China has endeavored to regulate its DFW 
in line with the requirement of international arrangements.   
 
(2) Implementation of Conservation Measures 
The RFMOs has developed various effective measures to combat the problem of 
decreasing fisheries resource and promote international cooperation of management of 
highly migratory species. China as a member of four tuna RFMOs has taken steps to 
implement the conservation measures adopted by the tuna RFMOs.  
  Total allowable catch (TAC) is a usefully mechanism to ensure the long-time 
sustainability of the tuna species, and the tuna RFMOs has developed an extensive set 
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of criteria to allocation schemes. In setting a TAC, whether that TAC is based on a 
multispecies quota or an individual fish stock quota, adequate data and scientific 
analysis is most crucial. In order to implement the TAC measures and provide the best 
scientific advance and the accurate catch data, the MOA stipulated the standardized 
logbook of tuna. National observers have been placed on board the tuna longline and 
large trawl vessels, to collect date. The China Distance Water Fisheries Association was 
established in 2012 with the aim to assistant implementation of management measures 
by carry out information exchange and technical training. All Chinese enterprises 
fishing in the high sea are members of China Distance Water Fisheries Association. To 
promote the international cooperation in catch data, seven implementation teams have 
been established in accordance with the seven RFMOs which China is a member of, to 
participate the regular meeting of the RFMOs and exchange views on fishery data and 
scientific research. 
 To comply with the specific trade measures taken by ICCAT, IOTC and IATT to deter 
IUU fishing. China started to implement the Catch Certification Scheme in 2010, which 
requires inspection of imported products according to customs codes of imported 
species.114 According to the Joint Announcement of the General Administration of 
Customs and the MOA(No.1696),115 the customs clearance certificates are required 
when bigeye tuna, sword fish, bluefin tuna and toothfish entering China. For the above-
mentioned fish species caught by Chinese fishing vessels that transported back to China, 
the customs clearance certificates are also required. In 2014, another Joint 
Announcement was issued to apply customs clearance certificates for legal fishing 
products to certain aquatic products imported from Russia.116 The catch certificate 
scheme combined the market access control with the marine fisheries management, and 
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effectively promote the long-time sustainability of the highly migratory fish stocks, 
especially the tuna species.  
 
(3) Address IUU Fishing  
IUU fishing is a long-time challenge that threaten the sustainability of transboundary 
fisheries, and the conservation measures adopted by the RFMOs could be greatly 
weakened by IUU fishing. As the world’s largest DWF nation, China also faces the 
challenge to tackle IUU fishing. In recently years, China has intensified its efforts to 
address the problem. The MOA has established a blacklist system for pelagic fishery 
enterprises,117 and it was announced that 15 people had been blacklisted, including six 
people whose enterprise licenses have been canceled and nine captains whose 
certificates have been withdrawn.118 The persons in the blacklist will be banned from 
working for a period time. In 2018, the MOA, for the first time, published a list of DWF 
companies and vessels that were penalised during the previous year. The penalties 
include cancellation of fuel subsidies or fishing licenses, and a five-year fishing ban on 
designated captains and crews. In order to prevent illegal fishing products from entering 
the market, the government also plans to create 10 fishing port clusters by 2025 with 
upgraded technology to better collect data on catches.119 Besides domestic efforts, 
China also take steps to cooperate with others to cracking down on IUU fishing. In July 
2018, China and EU signed the Declaration on the establishment of a Blue Partnership 
for the Ocean,120 and it provides that the two sides will promote the initiatives of the 
FAO and of relevant RFMOs aiming at fighting IUU fishing activities and exchange 
information to suspected fishing vessels and conduct follow-up cooperation.121  
 
 
117 See www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/YYJ/201701/t20170122_5462231.htm.  
118
 ‘General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture issued the Notification of illegal fishing vessel and handling 
opinions’, 20 March 2018, available at www.moa.gov.cn/nybgb/2018/201803/201805/t20180528_6143244.htm, last 
accessed 25 December 2019. 
119 See www.moa.gov.cn/gk/ghjh_1/201805/t20180503_6141333.htm, last accessed 25 December 2019 
120
 Declaration on the establishment of a Blue Partnership for the Oceans: towards better ocean governance, 
sustainable fisheries and a thriving maritime economy between the European Union and the People’s Republic of 
China, available at ec.europa.eu/newsroom/mare/document.cfm?doc_id=53843, last accessed 25 December 2019 
121 Ibid, p.5. 
31 
 
VII.  Conclusion  
The LOSC divides the ocean space into different jurisdictions, but the ocean space is 
closed interrelated. The governance of transboundary fisheries has long been of 
challenge to states. The complicated political and geographic characteristics of the seas 
surrounding China make the management of transboundary extremely difficult. 
Although China has signed bilateral fisheries agreement with Japan, Korea and Vietnam 
and improved cooperative management for shared stocks by the joint management in 
the PMZs, little effort has been done with the migratory species. It is suggested that 
China facilitate cooperation with neighboring coastal states to manage the 
transboundary fish stocks. The current fishery arrangement in the East China Sea and 
Yellow Sea is vulnerable and fisheries conflict is a threat to maritime security. The best 
way to prevent incidents is to encourage multilateral cooperation between China, Japan 
and Korea. China’s fisheries management in the South China is much more difficult 
due to the overlapping claims of sovereignty. However, over the past 20 years, the fish 
stocks and catch rates of the South China Sea have been dramatically declined,122 and 
fisheries cooperation requires no delay. To promote fisheries cooperation, there are two 
options: to create a RFMO for the management of fisheries or to establish a marine 
protected area in the South China Sea. China is now a member of seven RFMOs, which 
reflects China’s positive and cooperative attitude on the management of highly 
migratory species. Although China has taken steps to comply with the international 
standards and requirements, it still has much to do in future.  
 
 
122 South China Sea expert working group,’ A blueprint for fisheries management and environmental cooperation in 
the South China Sea,’ 13 September 2017, available at https://amti.csis.org/coc-blueprint-fisheries-environment/, 
last accessed 25 December 2019. 
